Z uwagi na to, iż najnowsze moduły nvidia nie są kompatybilne ze starszymi układami graficznymi, poniżej znajduje się opis instalacji otwartego modułu nouveau z eksperymentalną obsługą OpenGL. Opis został przetestowany na laptopie Dell Latitude D620 [ lspci: nVidia Corporation G72M [Quadro NVS 110M/GeForce Go 7300] (rev a1) ] – problemów nie odnotowano.

1. Na początku usuwamy niepotrzebne moduły nvidia i naprawiamy zależności związane z pakietem libgl:

# pacman -Rdds nvidia nvidia-utils

# pacman -S –asdeps libgl

2. Instalujemy moduł nouveau oraz eksperymentalną obsługę OpenGL:

# pacman -S xf86-video-nouveau

# pacman -S nouveau-dri

3. Edytujemy plik /boot/grub/menu.lst i usuwany wpisy nomodeset oraz vga=xxx.

4. Przeglądamy wpisy w /etc/modprobe.d/ sprawdzając, czy moduł nouveau nie został dodany do blacklisty.

5. Dodajemy moduł do initramfs w pliku /etc/mkinitcpio.conf: MODULES=”… nouveau” i generujemy nowy obraz:

# mkinitcpio -p linux

6. Z uwagi na to, że moduł jest wciąż w fazie eksperymentalnej, włączamy Magic SysRq aby móc dokonywać operacji niskiego poziomu bez względu na stan systemu np. Alt+SysRq+REISUB = unRaw, tErminate, kIll, Sync, Unmount, reBoot. W tym celu edytujemy plik /etc/sysctl.conf i ustawiamy zmienną kernel.sysrq = 1.

7. Jeśli posiadamy plik /etc/X11/xorg.conf zmieniamy jego nazwę tak, aby ustawienia trybu graficznego zostały dopasowane automatycznie. Po tych operacjach restartujemy system poleceniem reboot.

8. Znane są problemy z niektórymi aplikacjami wykorzystującymi libGL m.in. z firefox’em w trybie pełnoekranowym. Aby zapobiec wyłączaniu się aplikacji, należy uruchamiać ją ładując wcześniej potrzebną bibliotekę:

$ LD_PRELOAD=/usr/lib/libGL.so firefox

W przypadku problemów, należy wyświetlić pliki /usr/lib/libGL.* i sprawdzić przy której wersji biblioteki problemy nie będą występować.

Opis na podstawie ArchWiki: Nouveau, sysctl, NouveauWiki: LockupRecovery.

It is as if when I see the written character there were a paradigm, a pattern, present in my mind. But what sort of pattern?? What does it look like? Surely at any rate not like the character itself! – Well, like the character seen in this way then? But seen in what way? What notation can I use for the aspect? Well, what notation do we use; how do we communicate about it? I say, for example: „The sign, as I see it, looks to the right.” It might positively speak of a kind of visual centre of gravity, – might say: The centre of gravity of the sign F is here. Can I explain what I mean by this? No. – But I can compare this reaction of mine with other people’s reactions.

No aspect that is not (also) conception.

If he says „I see the figure (now) like this” and follows it in a definite way – this need not be so much a description as, so to speak, the seeing itself. But if he says „I have always seen it like that” this means that he has never seen it differently, and here he may be deceiving himself.

No, I didn’t have the paradigm continously before my mind – but when I describe the change of aspect, I use the paradigms in describing it.

„I’ve always seen it this way” – here one really means to say: „I have always conceived it this way, and this change of aspect has never taken place.”

„I’ve never seen it this way, always that.” Only this doesn;t make a proposition by itself. It lacks a field.

„I have always seen it with this face.” But you still have to say what face. And as soon yo add that, it’s no longer as if you had always done it.
„I have always seen this letter as having a peevish face.” Here one can ask: „Are you sure it was always?” That is to say: did the peevishness always strike you?

Absolute and relative pitch: Here is something similar: I hear the transition from one note to the other. But after a short time I can no longer recognize a note as the higher or lower of those two. And it doesn’t even have to make sense to speak of any such „recognition”; when, that is, there is no criterion for correct recognition.
It is almost as if the ‘seeing of the sign in this context’ were ad echo of a thought.

If someone says: „I am talking of a visual phenomenon, in which the visual picture, that is its organization, does change, although shapes and colours remain the same” – then I may answer him: „I know what you are talking about: I too should like to say what you say.” – So I am not saying: „Yes, the phenomenon we are both talking about is actually a change of organization…” but rather „Yes, this talk of the change of organization etc. is an expression of the experience which I mean too”.

„The organization of the visual image changes” has not the same kind of application as: „The organization of this company is changing”. Here I can describe how it is, if the organization of our company changes.

„It never occured to me that one can see the figure this way”: does it follow that it did occur to me, or that I knew, that one could see it the way I always have seen it?

I hear a note – so don’t I hear how loud it is? – Is it correct to say: if I hear the note, I must be conscioud of its degree of loudness? – It’s different if its strenght alters.

For when a child learns its letters, it doesn’t learn to see them this way and not otherwise. Am I to say, now, that at the change of aspect the man realizes that he has always seen a letter, say an R, in the same way? – Well, it might be so, but it isn’t so. No, that’s not the way we say. Rather, when someone says something like: for him the letter… has always had such-and-such a face, he would admit that in many cases he has not ‘thought’ of a face when he saw the letter.

Am I now to say: a ‘kind of seeing’ is associated with a letter for us? Certainly not; unless it means something like: a face gets associated with a letter.

What concept have we of sameness, of identity? You are familiar with the uses of the word „same” when what is in question is same colours, same sounds, same shapes, same lenghts, same feelings, and now you decide whether this case and that should be included in this family or not.

What is that is repulsive in the idea that we study the use od a word, point to mistakes in the description of this use and so on? First and foremost one asks oneself: How could that be so important to us? It depends on whether what one calls a ‘wrong description’ is a description that does not accord with established usage – or one which does not accord with the practice of the person giving the description. Only in the second case does a philisophical conflict arise.

Less repulsive is the idea that we form a wrong picture for ourselves, say of thinking. For here says to oneself: at least we have to do with thinking, not with the word „thinking”.
So we form a wrong picture of thinking. – But of what do we form a wrong picture; how do I know e.g. that you are forming a wrong picture of that, of which I too am forming a wrong picture?
Let us suppose that our picture of thinking was a human being, leaning his head on his hand while he talks to himself. Our question is not „Is that a correct picture?” but „How is this picture employed as a picture of thinking?”
Say, not: „We have formed a wrong picture of thinking” – but: „We don’t know our way about in the use of our picture, or of our pictures.” And hence we don’t know our way about in the use of our word.

It’s very easy to imagine someone knowing his way about a city quite accurately, i.e. he finds the shortest way from one part of the city to another quite surely – and yet that he should be perfectly incapable of drawing a map of the city. That, as soon as he tries, he only produces something completely wrong. (Our concept of ‘instinct’.)

Above all, someone attampting the description lacks any system. The systems that occur to him are inadequate, and he seems suddenly to find himself in a wilderness instead in the well laid garden that he knew so well. Rules occur to him, no doubt, but the reality shews nothing but exceptions.

And the rules of the foreground make it impossible for us to recognize the rules in the background. For when we keep the background together with the foreground, we see only jarring exceptions, in other words irregularity.

Do we say that anyone who talks sense is thinking? E.g. the builder in language-game? Might we not imagine the building and calling out of the words etc. in a surrounding in which we should not connect them up with any thinking? For „thinking” is akin to „considerating”.

„Carrying out a multiplication mechanically” (whether on paper or in the head): that is something to say – but „considering something mechanically”: for us, that contains a contradiction.

The expression, the behaviour, of considering. Of what do we say: It is considering something? Of a human being, sometimes of a beast. (Not of a tree or a stone.) One sign of considering is hestitating in what you do (Kohler). (Not just any hestitation.) Think of the ‘considering’ in ‘trying’. In ‘investigating’; in the expression of astonishment; of failure and of success.

What a lot of things a man must do in order for us to say he thinks!

„Thoughts and feelings are private” means roughly the same as „There is pretending”, or „One can hide one’s thoughts and feelings; can even lie and dissimulate”. And the question is, what is the import of this „There is…” and „One can”.

If someone says to me what he has thought – has he really said: what he though? Would not the actual mental event have to remain undescribed? – Was it not the secret thing, – of which I give another a mere picture in speech?

If I say what I think to someone, – do I know my thought here better than my words represent it? Is it as if I were acquainted with a body and shewed the other a mere photograph?

In philosophy, the comparison of thinking to a process that goes on in secret is a misleading one. As misleading as, e.g., the comparison of searching for the appropriate expression to the efforts of someone who is trying to make an exact copy of a line that only he can see.

You must remember the possibility of a language-game of ‘continuing a series of figures’, in which no rule, no expression of a rule is ever given, but the learning is done only by means of examples. So that the idea that each step can be justified by a somewhat – a kind of model – in out mind would be entirely alien to [some] people.

L. Wittgenstein, „Remarks on the philosophy of psychology”, Vol. I (excerpts), The University of Chicago Press 1988, p. 98-109e

Już się o grzechy noce proszą,
Już z wiosny znów jak z bólu krzyczę,
Nieubłaganą mnie rozkoszą
Zakuj w ramiona ratownicze!

A jeśli zacznę się na nowo
Wyrywać zbuntowanym ciałem,
Powiedz mi wreszcie pierwsze słowo,
którego nigdy nie słyszałem.

Bo znów pogański samum wieje,
W pędach, zawrotach, burzach, blaskach!
Pamiętaj: kiedy znów zdziczeję,
Odrzyj mnie z wichrów i ugłaskaj!

Julian Tuwim, „Erotyk”, http://www.wiersze.annet.pl